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Abstract 
Mental contrasting of a desired future with the present reality strengthens goal pursuit when 
expectations of success are high, and weakens goal pursuit when expectations of success are low. 
We hypothesized that mental contrasting effects on selective goal pursuit are mediated by a 
change in the meaning of the present reality as an obstacle towards reaching the desired future. 
Using explicit evaluation of reality (Study 1), implicit categorization of reality as obstacle (Study 
2), and detection of obstacle (Study 3) as indicators, we found that mental contrasting (versus 
relevant control groups) fostered the meaning of reality as obstacle when expectations of success 
were high, but weakened it when expectations of success were low. Importantly, the meaning of 
reality as obstacle mediated mental contrasting effects on goal pursuit (Study 1, 2). The findings 
suggest that mental contrasting produces selective goal pursuit by changing the meaning of a 
person’s reality.  
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Mental Contrasting Changes the Meaning of Reality 
Imagine two students wishing to finalize an important assignment over the weekend; the 
first one expecting to be able to do it, the second one not. While thinking about the assignment, 
both receive an email reminder about a Saturday night party. For the first student, seeing the 
party in the context of the assignment makes her realize that this party is standing in the way of 
completing her assignment. She had been looking forward to attending, but the party is not so 
alluring anymore; she cannot help but think of it as an obstacle to finishing her assignment. For 
the second student, seeing the party in the context of the assignment has the opposite effect. She 
realizes that she will probably not finish the assignment on the weekend anyway; she might as 
well enjoy the party! For her, the party is not an obstacle, but an opportunity for having fun. The 
different meanings that the two students give to the party shape their pursuit of finishing the 
assignment: the first is determined to complete it and refrains from attending the party, the 
second refrains from trying to finish and enjoys the party whole-heartedly.  
In these and similar situations, goal pursuit is influenced by the meaning that people 
assign to aspects of their life that are potential obstacles, such as the party in the example above. 
The present research tests whether these meanings stem from the way that people think about 
their wishes—specifically, using the self-regulatory strategy of mentally contrasting a desired 
future (e.g., finishing an assignment) with the reality standing in the way of the desired future 
(e.g., a party on Saturday night). We also test whether the meaning of the reality—as obstacle or 
not—is at least partially responsible for the effects of mental contrasting on goal pursuit.  
Mental Contrasting and Goal Pursuit 
Fantasy realization theory (Oettingen, 2000; Oettingen et al., 2001) identifies mental 
contrasting as a self-regulation strategy that leads people to utilize their expectations of reaching 
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the desired future. When people engage in mental contrasting, they first imagine a desired future, 
such as completing an assignment over the weekend, and then elaborate the present reality that 
stands in the way, such as a party on Saturday. Thereby, the question of whether the desired 
future can be attained is raised. Expectations of success provide the answer, and guide 
subsequent goal pursuit. When expectations of success are high, people commit to and strive for 
attaining the desired future, and when expectations of success are low, people disengage from 
attaining the desired future (e.g., Oettingen et al., 2001).  
A multitude of studies identified the effects of mental contrasting on goal commitment 
and goal striving (i.e., goal pursuit; summary by Oettingen, 2012): Given high expectations of 
success, participants in the mental contrasting condition showed immediate and tenacious goal 
pursuit; given low expectations of success, these participants showed weak goal pursuit. This 
pattern of results was replicated with diverse indicators of goal pursuit, including cognition (e.g., 
making plans), affect (e.g., feelings of anticipated disappointment in case of failure), motivation 
(e.g., feelings of energization, systolic blood pressure), and behavior (e.g., invested effort and 
actual achievement), and with outcomes assessed via self-report or observations, directly after 
the experiment or weeks later (Kappes, Pak, & Oettingen, 2012; Kappes, Singmann, & 
Oettingen, 2012; Oettingen, 2000; Oettingen, Mayer, Thorpe, Janetzke, & Lorenz, 2005; 
Oettingen et al., 2001; Oettingen et al., 2009; Oettingen, Mayer, Stephens, & Brinkmann, 2010; 
Oettingen, Mayer, & Thorpe, 2010).  
Although the effects of mental contrasting on goal pursuit have been consistently 
identified, relatively little is known about how mental contrasting generates these effects. In the 
present research, we hypothesized that mental contrasting modulates the meaning of the present 
reality. When people have high expectations of success, mental contrasting should strengthen the 
Mental Contrasting 5 
 
meaning of reality as an obstacle. In the opening example, for the student with high expectations, 
the party became an obstacle to completing the assignment. When people have low expectations 
of success, mental contrasting should weaken the meaning of the reality as an obstacle. Again in 
the opening example, for the student with low expectations, the party was not an obstacle, so she 
was able to whole-heartedly enjoy it. That is, mental contrasting should shape the meaning that 
people assign to the reality (i.e., to potential obstacles), which should in turn direct their goal 
pursuit.  
Assigning Meaning to Obstacles 
Two features of the mental contrasting exercise should enable a change in meaning of the 
reality, the elaboration of the present reality, and the context of the elaboration (i.e., after the 
desired future). Mental and written elaborations can change the meaning of the elaborated events 
and experiences by organizing and structuring them (e.g., Pennebaker & Beall, 1986; 
Pennebaker, Mayne, & Francis, 1997, Taylor, Pham, Rivkin, & Armor, 1998). Elaborating in 
writing on traumatic events, for instance, people gain insight into these events and are better able 
to appreciate the meaning of the events for their lives (Bower, Kemeny, Taylor, & Fahey, 1998; 
Creswell, et al., 2007; Chung & Pennebaker, 2008; Pennebaker et al., 1997; Ullrich & 
Lutgendorf, 2002). Importantly, the context of the elaborations influences the meaning that 
people extract (Barsalou, 2010, for an overview). When thinking about desired futures and the 
present reality, only elaborating on the reality against a backdrop of the desired future (as in 
mental contrasting) highlights the fact that the reality stands in the way of the desired future. 
 In the studies listed above, the effects of mental contrasting on goal pursuit have been 
distinguished from the effects of three other self-regulatory thoughts: Elaborating only the 
desired future (i.e., indulging), elaborating only the present reality (i.e., dwelling), or elaborating 
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first the reality and then the desired future (i.e., reverse contrasting). These alternatives differ 
from mental contrasting in that either the present reality is not elaborated (indulging), or that the 
reality is not elaborated in the context of the desired future (dwelling on reality and reverse 
contrasting). Elaborating just the reality (as in dwelling) or elaborating the reality before turning 
to the future (as in reverse contrasting) allows people to think about the reality without the 
context of the desired future. Therefore, dwelling and reverse contrasting leads to thinking about 
the reality per se. The students from our opening example, for instance, might think about what 
to wear to Saturday’s party, or with whom to attend. Only mental contrasting should induce her 
to think about the party as an obstacle to completing the desired assignment. 
 Because mental contrasting depicts the present reality against a backdrop of the desired 
future, expectations of success should guide the degree to which people come to understand the 
reality as an obstacle. The elaboration of the present reality in the context of the desired future 
during mental contrasting should strengthen the understanding of the reality as an obstacle when 
expectations of success are high. People realize that they can attain the desired future, but have to 
overcome the present reality to do so. In contrast, when expectations are low, people should 
realize that it is unlikely that they will attain the desired future, and that trying to overcome the 
present reality will be in vain. In sum, mental contrasting with high expectations of success 
should strengthen the meaning of the reality as an obstacle; mental contrasting with low 
expectations of success should weaken it.  
Obstacle Meaning as a Guide for Goal Pursuit 
We predicted that not only does mental contrasting change the meaning of the reality in 
line with expectations of success, but that this change in meaning guides subsequent pursuit of 
the desired future. Research finds that the identification of obstacles in the way of goal 
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attainment furthers goal pursuit (Gollwitzer, Bayer, & McCulloch, 2005; Oettingen, 1996, 
Oettingen et al., 2001; Zhang & Fishbach, 2010). Zhang and Fishbach (2010, Study 1), for 
instance, found that students who anticipated obstacles during an upcoming task increased their 
performance standards compared to those who did not expect obstacles. The increase in 
performance standards led participants to be more persistent on the subsequent task. Thus, 
following mental contrasting, once the reality acquires the meaning of an obstacle (i.e., when 
expectations are high), people should muster their efforts to overcome it and display strong goal 
pursuit. In contrast, once the reality loses the meaning of an obstacle (i.e., when expectations are 
low), people should refrain from efforts to overcome it in order to turn to other more promising 
endeavors. 
Interestingly, Zhang and Fishbach (2010, Study 3) also found that participants responded 
to obstacles with an increase in performance standards only when they expected that they could 
overcome the obstacles. Although these results do not speak to how the reality acquires the 
meaning of an obstacle for goal pursuit—as we have hypothesized that mental contrasting 
facilitates—these findings are in line with our reasoning, since they suggest that understanding 
something as an obstacle is important for preparing goal pursuit, and that this process depends on 
expectations of success.  To summarize, whereas previous research showed the importance of 
obstacles for goal pursuit, we examine whether a conscious process (i.e., mental contrasting) can 
help people who hold high expectations to understand the reality as on obstacle.  
Present Research 
We conducted three studies to test the idea that mental contrasting changes the meaning 
of the present reality as an obstacle standing in the way of attaining the desired future. 
Specifically, when paired with high expectations, mental contrasting should strengthen the 
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meaning of reality as an obstacle, but when paired with low expectations, it should weaken it. In 
all studies, we first measured expectations of success, then established a mental contrasting 
condition (versus control conditions), and finally, measured indicators of the meaning of reality 
as obstacle. We used indirect indicators (Osgood, Suci, & Tannenbaum, 1957) differing in each 
study – evaluation in Study 1, implicit categorization in Study 2, and obstacle detection in Study 
3 - to assess the range of the effects.  
In Study 1, we inferred the meaning of reality as an obstacle via the evaluation of the 
reality. In his work on measuring meaning, Osgood et al., (1957) identified the evaluation of an 
object as a fundamental dimension of meaning. The evaluation of a stimulus signifies its 
meaning in a particular situation (Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 2006), and such evaluations 
reflect the specific meaning of stimuli for goal pursuit (Ferguson & Bargh, 2008, for an 
overview). For instance, students with high expectations of academic success (i.e., high GPA) 
and an active academic goal evaluated distracting temptations more negatively—reflecting the 
meaning of these temptations as obstacles to academic success—than students without high 
expectations or without an active academic goal (Ferguson, 2007). Coming back to the initial 
example, the student who sees the party as an obstacle should also see the party as particularly 
negative.  
In Study 2, we measured the meaning of the reality as obstacle using implicit 
categorization. Categorization provides the framework for how people assign meaning to stimuli 
(Macrae, Milne, & Bodenhausen, 1994). In person perception, for instance, people first 
categorize a person and then use the knowledge associated with the category to infer what the 
person is like (Bodenhausen & Macrae, 1998; Brewer, 1988; Fiske & Neuberg, 1990). The 
categorizations applied reflect not only beliefs and attitudes (Choi, Nisbett, & Norenzayan, 1999, 
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Phelps et al., 2000), but also the current goal a person holds (Wheeler & Fiske, 2005). 
Specifically, the readiness with which the example students categorize an upcoming party as an 
obstacle to finishing an assignment or as a fun social activity depends on the meaning the party 
has for them.  
In Study 3, we observed whether participants detected new obstacles. Detection of 
relationally similar objects is another important indicator of meaning (Gentner & Smith, 2012). 
When people understand which role one object plays in relation to others, they switch from 
identifying similar objects in the environments based on the surface features (e.g., one man is 
similar to another man) to identifying similar objects based on the relational role they play in a 
given context (e.g., one man lifting a box is similar to a forklift lifting a box; Markman, & 
Gentner, 1993; Gentner & Markman, 1997; Gentner, Anggoro, & Klibanoff, 2011). Once the 
student understands that the party is an obstacle towards finishing the assignment, she should see 
that her favorite TV shows on the weekend are also obstacles.  
Whether the meaning of the reality as an obstacle was measured via evaluation, 
categorization, or detection, we had the same set of hypotheses. Mental contrasting paired with 
high expectations should strengthen the meaning of the reality as obstacle standing in the way of 
successful attainment of the future. On the other hand, mental contrasting paired with low 
expectations should weaken the meaning of reality as obstacle: now, the party can be perceived 
as a fun party. The first two studies also tested whether the meaning of the reality as an obstacle 
accounted for mental contrasting effects on goal pursuit. 
Study 1: Evaluation of the Reality  
In Study 1, we assessed the meaning of reality aspect as an obstacle via explicit 
evaluations of participants’ reality as being more or less negative. Explicit evaluations bring 
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affective reactions in line with current beliefs (Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 2006). For instances, 
one might have a positive, immediate reaction to a party, but when taking into account that the 
party is an obstacle standing in the way of successfully completing an assignment over the 
weekend, one might explicitly evaluate that party as more negative than when the party has no 
obstacle meaning. In other words, the explicit evaluation as negative should reflect whether 
participants understand the reality as obstacle standing in the way of attaining the desired future. 
Invited to a study about academic achievement, students first indicated their expectations 
of getting a desired grade in a given class, and then named an aspect of attaining the desired 
grade and an aspect of reality that might stand in the way of attaining the grade. Next, we 
induced a mental contrasting condition versus relevant control conditions. To measure the 
meaning of reality as obstacle, we asked students to evaluate their idiosyncratic reality aspect. 
Finally, we measured students’ efforts to prepare for the final exam as an indicator of goal 
pursuit. We predicted that students in the mental contrasting condition paired with high 
expectations should evaluate their reality aspect more negatively than the other participants, 
facilitating that they invest effort in their exam preparations. On the other hand, students in the 
mental contrasting condition paired with low expectations should evaluate their reality least 
negatively, leading them to invest little effort.  
We included two control conditions, a reverse contrasting and a dwelling condition. In 
the reverse contrasting condition, students first mentally elaborated the reality, then the desired 
future. Hence, reverse contrasting students elaborated the same content as mental contrasting 
students but in reverse order, testing our prediction that elaborating the reality without the 
context of the desired future (i.e., elaborating the reality first) does not highlight the obstacle 
character. In the dwelling condition, students only elaborated their reality. This condition tested 
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our prediction that the meaning of the reality as an obstacle is not affected when only focusing 
on the reality, rather a meaningful relation needs to be made to the desired future.  
Method 
Participants 
One hundred and thirty students (100 female, age M = 19.5 years, SD = .9) participated in 
return for partial credit toward a psychology course requirement. We randomly assigned students 
either to a mental contrasting condition (n = 43), a reverse contrasting condition (n = 44), or a 
dwelling condition (n = 44).  
Procedure and Materials 
Students learned that the study was designed to find correlates of final exam 
performances and that they would complete one part in the lab and another part later via email. 
In the lab, students first named the grade they wished to receive on the final exams of the 
psychology course they were getting the credit for. For measuring expectations of success, 
students indicated how likely they thought it was that they would get the desired grade on a 7-
point scale ranging from 1 (not at likely) to 7 (extremely likely). To check the incentive value of 
this desired future, we measured the importance of getting the desired grade, on a 7-point scale 
ranging from 1 (not at all important) to 7 (extremely important).  
Thereafter, students listed one desired future aspect that they associated with attaining the 
desired grade. They named, for example, “improving the GPA”, “proud parents”, or “better 
chances for grad school”. Next, students read the following prompt for naming aspects of the 
reality: 
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Now, please list two aspects that stand in the way of achieving the desired grade. Please 
note the first two things that come to your mind! Use one or two keywords to describe 
each aspect! 
Students named, for example, “TV shows”, “dorm parties”, or “procrastination”. All 
students thereafter indicated which of the two reality aspects was more important to them.  
Thereafter, we established three experimental conditions: a mental contrasting condition, 
a reverse contrasting condition, and a dwelling condition. In the mental contrasting condition, 
participants imagined and wrote about their desired future and their most important reality 
aspect, beginning with the desired future. To elicit the intended thoughts and images, participants 
read the following instructions for both desired future and reality:  
Think about this aspect in vivid detail and write about all the thoughts and images that 
come to mind. Let your mind wander and allow these events and experiences to play out. 
Don’t hesitate to give your thoughts and images free rein. Take as much time as you 
need. 
In the reverse contrasting condition, students received the same instructions but started 
with writing about their most important reality aspect before writing about their future. In the 
dwelling condition, students received the same instructions, but wrote about both of their reality 
aspects, starting with the less important one.  
Dependent Variables 
Reality evaluation. At the end of the lab session, we asked participants to evaluate the 
keyword they had named earlier as most important reality aspect. Students rated the pleasantness 
of their keyword on a 7-point scale ranging from 1 (pleasant) to 7 (unpleasant). Note that 
students in the dwelling condition, even though they elaborated two reality aspects, only 
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evaluated the keyword that they had previously rated as more important. Thereby, all students 
rated the reality aspect that they rated as more important.  
 Exam preparation. Finally, we measured preparation for the final exam. Before their 
final exam, students received an email. Out of 131 students in our study, 92 answered. 
Participant who did answer the email did not differ from students who did not answer the email 
in expectations of success (p = .71), importance of getting the desired grade (p = .98), or the 
desired grade, (p = .19). The email was sent at the end of a week, so that all students could report 
their preparatory activities during the week. The message arrived close enough to the final exam 
to be already relevant for preparing; however, the final exam was far enough away to assure that 
we did not measure hectic last minute activities (M = 15.2 days before the final exam; SD = 2.3). 
In this email, students indicated on a 7-point scale, ranging from 1 (not at all) to 7 (extremely), 
how intensely they studied, how much effort they invested, and how focused they were regarding 
their work for the final exam during the last week. These items were combined to one scale 
indicating exam preparation (α = .72).  
Results 
Descriptive Data  
Ninety-two (70.2%) of the 131 students named an A as desired grade at the final exam, 
11 (8.4%) students named an A-, 12 (9.2%) named a B+, 12 (9.2%) named a B, and 3 (2.4 %) 
students named a B-. Attaining the desired grade was a high incentive for students as indicated 
by a mean importance above the midpoint of a 7-point scale, M = 5.75 (SD = 1.26). Students had 
moderate expectations of earning the desired grade, M = 4.71 (SD = 1.34).  
Reality Evaluation  
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We followed the procedures recommended by Aiken and West (1991) and West, Aiken, 
Wu, and Taylor (2007; see also Kashy, Donnellan, Ackerman, & Russell, 2009) for testing the 
interaction effects between continuous and categorical measures. We conducted a hierarchical 
regression analysis predicting each dependent measure (i.e., reality evaluation, exam preparation) 
from (a) two dummy-coded contrasts for the main effects of condition, (b) the centered main 
effects of expectations, and (c) two interaction terms between expectations and each condition 
contrast. Hierarchical analysis allowed us to test the significance of adding the interactions terms 
into the model via examining the change in R2. 
When significant, we examined the association between expectations and the dependent 
variable in each experimental condition. We expected that expectations would show an 
association to the dependent variables only in the mental contrasting condition. Finally, we 
assessed whether mental contrasting effects at the high end (expectations = 7) and the low end of 
the expectations scale (expectations = 1) differed from those in the other conditions (West, 
Aiken, Wu, & Taylor, 2007). To do so, we computed two sets of conditional expectations x 
condition interaction terms, one set for high expectations and one set for low expectations and 
substituted these terms for the interaction terms in our original analysis. The coefficient for each 
condition contrast shows the difference between mental contrasting and control conditions for 
high and low expectations. Note that we do not provide effect size estimates for these 
comparisons since they are based on estimated values, rather than observed values.  
Following these procedures, we tested for expectancy-dependent mental contrasting 
effects on reality evaluation. As predicted, adding the interaction terms to the hierarchical 
regression analysis improved the model, R2change = 7%, Fchange(2,125) = 5.06, p = .008 (see Figure 
1, left side).  
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In the mental contrasting condition, expectations predicted reality evaluation, β = -.53, 
t(125) = 3.48, p = .001. The higher the expectations of success were the more negative the 
evaluation of the reality. Expectations did not predict reality evaluation in the reverse contrasting 
condition, β = .07, t(125) = .53, p = .60, or in the dwelling condition, β = .03, t(125) = .14, p = 
.90. Furthermore, the relation between expectations and reality evaluation in the mental 
contrasting condition was stronger than in the reverse contrasting condition, t(125) = 3.02, p = 
.003, and it was stronger than in the dwelling condition, t(125) = 2.06, p = .04. The relation 
between expectations and reality evaluation did not differ between the reverse contrasting and 
the dwelling condition, t(125) = .19, p = .85. Finally, when expectations of success were high, 
students in the mental contrasting condition evaluated their reality aspect more negatively than 
students in the reverse contrasting condition, t(125) = 2.28, p = .02, and students in the dwelling 
condition, t(125) = 2.33, p = .02. When expectations of success were low, students in the mental 
contrasting condition evaluated their reality aspect less negatively than students in the reverse 
contrasting condition, t(125) = 3.02, p = .003, and students in the dwelling condition, t(125) = 
2.06, p = .04 
Exam Preparation 
To examine mental contrasting effects on the preparations for the exam, we used a 
hierarchical regression analysis predicting exam preparation, and entered the main effects of 
expectation of success and two dummy codes representing the three conditions in the first step, 
and the two interaction terms between expectations and each condition in the second step. Again, 
adding the interaction terms improved the model, R2change = 8%, Fchange(2,86) = 3.89, p = .02 (see 
Figure 1, right side).  
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In the mental contrasting condition, expectations of success predicted exam preparation, β 
=.44, t(86) = 2.30, p = .02. The higher the expectations, the more students prepared themselves 
for the final exam. Expectations did not predict exam preparation in the reverse contrasting 
condition, β = -.09, t(86) = .66, p = .50, or in the dwelling condition, β = -.37, t(86) = 1.45, p = 
.15. Furthermore, the relation between expectations and exam preparation in the mental 
contrasting condition was stronger than in the reverse contrasting condition, t(86) = 2.2, p = .03, 
and the dwelling condition, t(86) = 2.6, p = .01. The relation between expectations and exam 
preparation did not differ between the reverse contrasting and dwelling condition, t(86) = .96, p = 
.38. Finally, when expectations of success were high, students in the mental contrasting 
condition reported more exam preparation than students in the reverse contrasting condition, 
t(86) = 2.8, p = .005, and students in the dwelling condition, t(86) = 3.3, p = .001. When 
expectations of success were low, students in the mental contrasting condition tended to report 
less exam preparation than students in the dwelling condition, t(86)  = 1.76, p = .08, while the 
difference in the reverse contrasting condition pointed into the right direction, it did not research 
significance, t(86)  = 1.5, p = .13. 
Reality Evaluation as Mediator  
So far, we found that mental contrasting (versus control conditions) paired with high 
expectations led to comparatively more negative reality evaluations and to better exam 
preparation. On the contrary, when paired with low expectations mental contrasting (versus 
control conditions) led to comparatively less negative reality evaluations and tended to lead to 
less exam preparation. In the control conditions, expectations of success did not predict the 
evaluation of the reality or exam preparation. In a last step, we examined whether this difference 
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between the conditions in expectancy-dependent exam preparation was mediated by reality 
evaluation.  
Describing the analysis of such a moderated mediation, Muller, Judd, and Yzerbyt (2005) 
call for predicting the dependent variable (exam preparation) with a model that includes the 
independent variables (conditions), the moderator (expectations), their interaction terms, the 
mediator (reality evaluation), and the moderator-mediator interaction term (expectations by 
reality evaluation). The coefficient for the condition by expectations interaction in this model 
should be compared to the coefficient for the condition by expectations interaction from the 
model without the mediator and its interactions. Note that no formal test for the difference is 
necessary (see also Preacher, Rucker, & Hayes, 2007).  
This moderated mediation analysis yielded a smaller expectation by condition interaction 
effect for the comparison of the mental contrasting condition with the reverse contrasting 
condition, β = -.24, than that in the initial model, β = -.40, and it was not significant, t(85) = 
1.21, p = .23. Comparing the mental contrasting condition to the dwelling condition showed the 
same results. Specifically, the expectation by condition interaction effect for the comparison of 
the mental contrasting condition with the dwelling condition was smaller, β = -.23, than that in 
the initial model, β = -.32, and it was not significant, t(85)  = 1.74, p = .08. Hence, the difference 
between the mental contrasting condition and the reverse contrasting as well as the dwelling 
condition in the relation between expectations and exam preparation was at least partially 
mediated by reality evaluation.  
Discussion 
Mental contrasting (versus control conditions) paired with high expectations led to 
comparatively more negative evaluations of the reality aspect, pointing to an strengthened 
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meaning of the reality as an obstacle. Mental contrasting (versus control groups) paired with low 
expectations led to comparatively less negative evaluations of the reality, pointing to a weakened 
meaning of the reality as an obstacle. Second, neither the reverse contrasting condition nor the 
dwelling condition affected the evaluation of the reality, supporting our notion that for 
comprehending the meaning of obstacles it is not sufficient to first think about the reality and 
then turn to the future (as in the reverse contrasting condition) nor to merely focus on the reality 
(as in the dwelling condition). Finally, we found that the evaluation of the reality mediated 
mental contrasting effects on exam preparation, pointing to the change in meaning as a trigger of 
efforts to attain a desired future.  
Although indicative, the present findings on the evaluation of the reality aspect are just 
one indicator of the changed meaning of reality as obstacle. Therefore, in the next study, we 
sought to replicate these results with a different indicator. Specifically, we investigated whether 
participants implicitly categorized their reality as an obstacle.  
Study 2: Implicit Obstacle Categorization of Reality Aspect 
We used a task-switching paradigm (Kiesel et al., 2010; Vandierendonck, Liefooghe, & 
Verbruggen, 2010, for overviews) to measure the implicit obstacle categorization of participants’ 
reality. In our version, students worked on two different tasks in random order. They decided 
either whether a word was an obstacle-word or an aid-word (categorization task), or whether it 
was presented in yellow or blue (color naming task). We used the same response keys for both 
tasks. In particular, pressing the left key indicated an aid-word in the categorization task and 
yellow print in the color naming task. Pressing the right key, on the other hand, indicated an 
obstacle-word in the categorization task and blue print in the color naming task.  
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Implicit obstacle categorization of the reality was measured during color naming trials. 
When a participant’s reality aspect, such as “party,” was presented in blue, it was a compatible 
stimulus (i.e., obstacle word and blue were indicated with the right key). The more that 
participants implicitly categorized the reality as obstacle, the faster they should respond during 
these color naming trials, because the relevant task-set (i.e., name the color) and the irrelevant 
task-set (i.e., categorize the word) activate the same responses (i.e., press right key). In contrast, 
when the reality aspect “party” was presented in yellow, it was an incompatible stimulus (i.e., 
obstacle word and yellow are indicated with different keys). Hence, the more that participants 
implicitly categorized the reality as obstacle, the slower they should respond because the relevant 
task-set (i.e., name the color) and the irrelevant task-set (i.e., categorize the word) activate 
different responses (press right key versus left). The difference in performance (i.e., reaction 
times and errors) on compatible versus incompatible stimuli (i.e., compatibility effect, e.g., 
Meiran, 1996; Rogers & Monsell, 1995) for participants’ reality words during color naming was 
therefore a measure of their implicit obstacle categorization.  
We administered this task switching paradigm in the context of a study about students’ 
desired graduate schools, after inducing a mental contrasting condition and control conditions. 
Like in Study 1, we wanted to test whether the meaning of reality—this time, indicated by 
implicit obstacle categorization—supports goal pursuit. We measured goal pursuit as indicated 
by feelings of responsibility. Such feelings signal that a person assumes responsibility for 
attaining the desired future rather than leaving it up to external circumstances (Cantor et al., 
1987; Oettingen et al., 2001). Based on Oettingen et al. (2001), we asked students to what extent 
they perceived external circumstances to be responsible for being accepted by the desired 
graduate school (Oettingen et al., 2001). Since understanding the reality as an obstacle highlights 
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what stands in the way, it should foster goal pursuit as indicated by the feeling that success 
depends on one’s own actions. Thus, implicit obstacle categorization should account for mental 
contrasting effects on feelings of responsibility.  
One limitation of Study 1 is that it is not necessarily the case that mental contrasting 
strengthened versus weakened interpretations of the reality as obstacle. Instead, it could be that 
the dwelling and reverse contrasting conditions changed these evaluations, and the mental 
contrasting condition left them untouched. To address this question, in Study 2 we added a 
control condition in which students elaborated unrelated materials. Reality categorization and 
goal pursuit in this condition provide a baseline for comparison. We also included the reverse 
contrasting condition, to control for exposure to content.  
Method 
Participants 
 One hundred nineteen students (age M = 20.1 years, SD = 1.3, female = 70) participated 
in return for partial course credit. Students were randomly assigned to either a mental contrasting 
condition (n = 44), a reverse contrasting condition (n = 38), or an irrelevant content control (n = 
37) condition.  
Procedure and Materials 
 We invited students to a study about undergraduates’ thoughts about graduate (“grad”) 
school. Throughout the study the term grad school was used to refer to law school, medical 
school, business school, or a graduate school of the sciences. Students then listed the graduate 
school they aspired to attend. To measure expectations of success, students responded to the 
question “How likely do you think it is that you will go to this grad school?” on a scale ranging 
from 1 (not at likely) to 7 (extremely likely). Next, students listed a desired outcome that they 
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associated with the future of going to their desired graduate school (students named e.g., “getting 
a Ph.D.”, or “best law school in the nation”). Thereafter, they listed a reality aspect that might 
stand in the way of going to the desired graduate school. In particular, students read: 
What could stand in the way of going to this grad school? What could prevent you from 
going there? Please list one aspect that might prevent you from going to this grad school. 
Using keywords, please note the first thing that comes to your mind! 
Students named reality aspects such as “high levels of stress”, or “lack of money.” In 
order to obtain words for use in the task switching task, students summarized their reality aspect 
with one word that best represented the aspect. Students summarized the reality aspect with 
words such as “stress” and “money.” Finally, students listed one aid that might help them to go 
to their desired graduate school (students named e.g., “getting good grades”, or “gaining 
experience”) and summarized the aid with one word that best represented the aid (e.g., “grades” 
and “experience”).  
Thereafter, we established three experimental conditions: a mental contrasting condition, 
a reverse contrasting condition, and an irrelevant content control condition. In the mental 
contrasting condition, students mentally elaborated on and wrote about their desired future and 
their reality aspect, beginning with the desired future. In the reverse contrasting condition, 
students elaborated on the same content, but started with elaborating the reality aspect. Finally, 
in the irrelevant content control condition, students first imagined and elaborated a positive 
experience with one of their teachers at school and second, a recent, negative experience with 
one of their teachers.  
Task Switching Paradigm   
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During the task switching paradigm, students performed two different tasks in random 
order, a categorization task and a color naming task, using the same set of response keys. 
Specifically, students learned that when the presented word was white, they had to categorize the 
word as either obstacle-related or aid-related (i.e., categorization task). Students pressed the right 
key for obstacle-words, and the left key for aid-words. During this categorization task, we 
presented three obstacle-words (i.e., hindrance, obstruct, barrier) and three aid-words (i.e., assist, 
support, facilitate). When the presented word was blue or yellow, participants had to identify the 
color of the word (i.e., color naming task). Here, they pressed the right key for blue, and the left 
key for yellow. During the color naming task, we presented two obstacle-words (i.e., obstacle, 
block) as well as two aid-words (i.e., aid, help) in blue and yellow. Additionally, the 
idiosyncratic words created by the students, representing their reality aspects and their aids, were 
used as well.  
It is important to note that the idiosyncratic reality-words were never explicitly 
categorized as an obstacle. It is currently debated to what extent compatibility effects in task 
switching paradigms are caused by stimulus-specific practice, creating links between the 
stimulus and the category (Kiesel, Wendt, & Peters, 2007). In our case, such practice would 
mean that participants explicitly categorize their reality-word as obstacle, thereby creating 
mental links between the reality-word and the obstacle response. Such links, rather than the 
implicit categorization of the reality-word, might then cause compatibility effects during the 
color naming task. To avoid any influence of such stimulus-specific practice during the 
categorization task, students never explicitly categorized their idiosyncratic reality- and aid-
words as either obstacles or aides (see Wendt & Kiesel, 2008, for a similar approach). 
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The whole task-switching procedure consisted of 520 trials. Participants started with 40 
practice trials and then performed 480 critical trials, presented in 10 blocks with 48 trials each. In 
each block, participants indicated the color of the presented word on half of the trials, and 
categorized the presented word on the other half of the trials. The 24 color-naming trials 
consisted of 12 blue words and 12 yellow words. The 24 categorization trials consisted of 12 
obstacle trials and 12 aid trials. On obstacle trials, three different obstacle words (i.e., hindrance, 
obstruct, barrier) were presented four times each. The task (i.e., word categorization vs. color 
naming) was chosen randomly on each trial, so that participants did not know which task was 
coming next, and thereby could not prepare for it. Although compatibility effects are often 
unaffected by task preparation—a finding referred to as one of the more surprising observations 
in the task-switching literature (Monsell et al., 2003, p. 338)—we tried to minimize preparatory 
activities for the next trial by complete randomization. 
As main dependent measure, we calculated the compatibility effect on task switching 
trials for students’ reality-words. Reaction times and error proportions were calculated by 
averaging across all of the color naming trials with reality-word trials that were preceded by one 
or more categorization trials. Error trials were excluded for reaction time analyses. To obtain a 
measure of implicit obstacle categorization, we subtracted reaction times and errors on 
compatible trials (i.e., reality-words printed in blue) from reaction times and errors on 
incompatible trials (i.e., reality-words printed in yellow). Hence, higher scores indicated stronger 
implicit obstacle categorization.  
Note that we only used switch trials (i.e., color naming trials preceded by categorization 
trials) to compute our implicit obstacle categorization estimates. Based on theoretical reasoning 
and on empirical findings, switch trials should be best suited to measure implicit obstacle 
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categorization. First, numerous task switching studies found a larger compatibility effect on 
switch trials than on repetition trials (e.g., Kiesel et al., 2010; Meiran, 2000); a finding we 
replicated with our paradigm (see below). The compatibility effect of the reality-word is driven 
by a) how strongly the categorization task set is active, and b) how strongly the color naming 
task set is active. When switching from categorization to color naming (i.e., switch trials), the 
categorization task set should be more active than when repeating the color naming task (i.e., 
repetition trials). Hence, the chance to observe any manipulation effects on the compatibility 
effects should be best on switch trials. Second, compatibility effects are decreased during task 
repetition when the previous trial was incompatible (Kiesel et al, 2006). Applied to our 
paradigm, this suggests that if participants had an incompatible color naming trial (e.g., the word 
“barrier” presented in yellow) beforehand, the compatibility effects for the reality-word on trials 
thereafter are reduced. Hence, half of the repetition trials (i.e., the ones preceded by incompatible 
trials) are not well suited to measure compatibility effects for the reality-words. To summarize, 
switch trials, rather than repetition trials are most appropriate to measure the implicit obstacle 
categorization of participants’ reality-words.  
Goal Pursuit  
Finally, we measured feelings of responsibility as indicator of goal pursuit. Students 
indicated to what extent they perceived external circumstances to be responsible for getting in 
the desired graduate school, using a 7-point scale ranging from 1(not at all) to 7 (very). The item 
was reverse-coded so that higher numbers indicated stronger feelings of personal responsibility 
(Oettingen et al., 2001, Study 1). 
Results 
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Data of three students were not included into the analysis because the students failed to 
summarize either their reality aspect or their aid with one word; instead they provided several 
words. Hence, the final sample consisted of 115 students.   
Task Switching Paradigm  
First, we tested whether we could replicate previous findings on switch costs, which 
would indicate that our task switching paradigm measured the implicit categorization of the 
reality aspects via compatibility effects on color-naming trials. We expected that performance 
(i.e., reaction times and errors) on color-naming trials would be weaker for incompatible stimuli 
(i.e., stimuli with different responses on both tasks) compared to compatible stimuli (i.e., stimuli 
with same responses on both tasks) for obstacle- and aid-words, thereby indicating compatibility 
effects of the task irrelevant dimension (i.e., obstacle-related or aid-related) during the color-
naming trials. Moreover, these compatibility effects should be most pronounced after task 
switches from the categorization task to the color-naming task.  
 We conducted a repeated measures analysis of variance with the factors compatibility 
(incompatible versus compatible), task sequence (repetition versus switch), and type of words 
(obstacle-words versus aid-words) on reaction times. The results showed the expected main 
effects of compatibility, F(1,114) = 27.54, p < .001, and task sequence, F(1,114) = 164.21, p < 
.001, as well as the expected interaction effect between compatibility and task sequence, 
F(1,114) = 10.60, p = .004. Specifically, students responded slower to incompatible than to 
compatible trials (M = 673 ms versus M = 631 ms) and they responded slower on switch trials 
than on repetition trials (M = 710 ms versus M = 593 ms). Importantly, we found that 
compatibility effects (i.e., reaction times on compatible trials subtracted from reaction times on 
incompatible trials) were stronger on task switches (M = 60 ms) than on task repetition trials (M 
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= 25 ms). Finally, we did not find a main effect for type of words (i.e., obstacle versus aid) or 
any two-way or three-way interaction effects between type of words, sequence, and 
compatibility, Fs < 1.6, ps > .20.  
Applying the same analysis to the error rates replicated the pattern of results. There were 
the expected main effects of compatibility, F(1,114) = 82.21, p < .001, and task sequence, 
F(1,114) = 47.39, p < .001, and the interaction effect between compatibility and task sequence, 
F(1,114) = 28.85, p < .001. Specifically, students generated more errors on incompatible than on 
compatible trials (M = .08 versus M = .03) and generated more errors on switch trials than on 
repetition trials (M = .07 versus M = .03). Importantly, compatibility effects (i.e., error rate on 
compatible trials subtracted from error rate on incompatible trials) were stronger on task 
switches (M = .08) than on task repetition trials (M = .03). Furthermore, we did not find a main 
effect for type of words (i.e., obstacle versus aid) or any two-way or three-way interaction effects 
between type of word, sequence, and compatibility, Fs < .6, ps > .43.  
These results imply that the obstacle-words and aid-words were implicitly categorized on 
color naming trials, which caused compatibility effects in reaction times and errors rates, 
especially on task switch trials. Thus, the task switching paradigm detected whether students 
implicitly categorized a word as either an obstacle or an aid.  
Implicit Categorization of the Reality as Obstacle  
 We hypothesized that students with high expectations of success after mental contrasting 
would show the strongest compatibility effects for their reality-words, whereas students with low 
expectations of success after mental contrasting would show the weakest compatibility effects.  
Compatibility effects derived from reaction times. First, we looked at compatibility 
scores derived from reaction times. We used hierarchical regression analysis predicting the 
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compatibility scores of students’ reality-words, and entered the main effects of expectation of 
success and two dummy codes for the three conditions in the first step, and the two interaction 
terms between expectations and each condition in the second step. As predicted, adding the 
interaction terms improved the model, R2change = 6%, Fchange(2,109) = 3.89, p =.02 (Figure 2, left). 
In the mental contrasting condition, expectations predicted compatibility scores, β = .63, t(109) = 
3.71, p = .001. The higher the expectations of success, the stronger were the compatibility scores. 
Expectations did not predict compatibility scores in the reverse contrasting condition, β = .06, 
t(109) = .42, p = .67, or in the irrelevant content control condition, β = .07, t(109)  = 0.41, p = 
.89. Furthermore, the relation between expectations and compatibility scores in the mental 
contrasting condition was stronger than in the reverse contrasting condition, t(109) = 2.60, p = 
.01, and in the irrelevant content control condition, t(109) = 2.33, p = .02. The relation between 
expectations and compatibility scores did not differ between the reverse contrasting and 
irrelevant content control condition, t(109)= .05, p = .95.  
 Finally, when expectations of success were high, students in the mental contrasting 
condition tended to show stronger compatibility effects than students in the reverse contrasting 
condition, t(109)  = 1.81, p = .07, and had stronger compatibility effects than students in the 
irrelevant content control condition, t(109)  = 2.02, p = .04. When expectations of success were 
low, students in the mental contrasting condition showed weaker compatibility effects than 
students in the reverse contrasting condition, t(109) = 2.84, p = .005, and students in the 
irrelevant content control condition, t(109)  = 2.22, p = .03 (Figure 2, left). 
Compatibility effects derived from errors. We replicated this pattern of results with a 
compatibility measure derived from errors. Adding the interaction terms improved the model, 
R2change = 9%, Fchange (2,109) = 5.83, p = .004 (Figure 2, middle). In the mental contrasting 
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condition, expectations predicted compatibility scores, β = .70, t(109) = 4.01, p < .001. The 
higher the expectations of success, the stronger the compatibility scores were, indicating stronger 
implicit obstacle categorization. Expectations did not predict compatibility scores in the reverse 
contrasting condition, β = .01, t(109) = .07, p = .94, or in the irrelevant content control condition, 
β = -.01, t(109) = 0.04, p = .97. Also, the relation between expectations and compatibility scores 
in the mental contrasting condition was stronger than in the reverse contrasting condition, t(109) 
= 3.15, p = .002, and in the irrelevant content control condition, t(109) = 2.90, p = .004. The link 
between expectations and compatibility scores did not differ between the reverse contrasting and 
irrelevant content control condition, t(109) = .02, p = .98. When expectations of success were 
high, students in the mental contrasting condition showed stronger compatibility effects than 
students in the reverse contrasting condition, t(109) = 3.40, p = .001, and students in the 
irrelevant content control condition, t(109) = 2.95, p = .004. When expectations of success were 
low, students in the mental contrasting condition showed weaker compatibility effects than 
students in the reverse contrasting condition, t(109) = 2.32, p = .02, and students in the irrelevant 
content control condition, t(109) = 2.38, p = .02. 
Control Analyses   
One feature of students’ reality-words was that they were generated by the participants. 
Thus one might argue that mental contrasting effects on categorization of reality-words were 
observed because these words were self-generated. Though this explanation is unlikely (reality-
words were also self-generated in the control conditions), we tried to exclude this alternative 
interpretation. Specifically, we tested the effects of expectations, conditions, and their interaction 
on the compatibility scores of the idiosyncratic help words. As expected, none of the main 
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effects or interaction effects neither for compatibility scores derived from reaction times nor 
derived from errors reached significance, βs < .13, ps < .50.  
But maybe not only students’ idiosyncratic reality-words were categorized as obstacles, 
but the category of obstacles in general was differentially affected by the mental contrasting vs. 
control conditions. We predicted that mental contrasting changes the meaning of a specific 
aspect of reality, but does not affect the category obstacles in general. For example, when 
students think about the reality that stands in the way of being admitted to their desired graduate 
school such as having not quite the GPA yet, students should ready themselves to invest 
resources whenever GPA-related thoughts are triggered. They should not ready themselves to 
invest resources when they see the word “obstacle” written on a blackboard. Hence, we only 
expected mental contrasting effects on the idiosyncratic word, not on the word for the category 
of obstacle (i.e., the words barrier, obstacle) in the color naming task. We tested the effects of 
expectations, conditions, and their interaction on the compatibility scores derived from the words 
for the category of obstacle (i.e., barrier, obstacle) in the color naming task. Again, none of the 
main effects or interaction effects reached significance, βs < .19, ps < .29. To summarize, mental 
contrasting seems to affect the categorization of students’ idiosyncratic reality aspects rather than 
making the category of obstacles more accessible.  
Feelings of Responsibility 
Next, we tested whether mental contrasting affected feelings of responsibility in line with 
expectations of success. Applying the same set of analysis as before showed the predicted pattern 
of results. Specifically, adding the interaction terms improved the model, R2change = 5%, 
Fchange(2,111) = 3.26, p = .04 (Figure 2, right side). In the mental contrasting condition, 
expectations predicted feelings of responsibility, β = .46, t(111) = 2.49 p = .01. Expectations did 
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not predict feelings of responsibility in the reverse contrasting condition, β = .10, t(111) = .77, p 
= .43, or in the irrelevant content control condition, β = .04, t(111) = .30, p = .80. Furthermore, 
the relation between expectations and feelings of responsibility in the mental contrasting 
condition was stronger than in the reverse contrasting condition, t(111) = 2.46, p = .02, and in the 
irrelevant content control condition, t(111) = 1.99, p = .05. The relation between expectations 
and feelings of responsibility did not differ between the reverse contrasting and irrelevant 
content control condition, t(111) = .28, p =.78. When expectations of success were high, students 
in the mental contrasting condition had stronger feelings of responsibility than students in the 
reverse contrasting condition, t(111) = 1.62, p = .01, but not than students in the irrelevant 
content control condition, t(111) = 1.36, p = .17. When expectations of success were low, 
students in the mental contrasting condition showed weaker feelings of responsibility than 
students in the reverse contrasting condition, t(111) = 2.86, p = .005, and weaker feelings of 
responsibility than students in the irrelevant content control condition, t(111) = 2.33, p = .02. To 
summarize, we replicated past research (Oettingen et al., 2001) showing that mental contrasting 
fosters feelings of responsibility when expectations of success are high, and weakens feelings of 
responsibility when expectations of success are low.  
Implicit Categorization of Reality as Obstacle: Mediator Analyses 
In the last step, we tested whether mental contrasting effects on feelings of responsibility 
were mediated by implicit obstacle categorization. We applied the same analysis to test the 
mediated moderation as in Study 1. We started by using the compatibility scores derived from 
reaction times. This analysis had yielded a smaller expectation by condition interaction effect for 
the comparison with the reverse contrasting condition, β = .38 (compared to β = .70), and a 
smaller interaction effect for the comparison with the irrelevant content control condition, β = 
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.28, (compared to β = .66). Both interaction terms stayed significant, t(110)  = 2.40, p = .02, and, 
t(110)  = 2.04, p = .04, respectively. These results indicate that the difference between the mental 
contrasting condition and the reverse contrasting condition as well as between the mental 
contrasting condition and the irrelevant content control condition in the relation between 
expectations and feelings of responsibility was partially mediated by implicit categorization of 
reality as obstacle, measured by the compatibility scores derived from reaction times. 
We observed the same pattern of results using the compatibility effect scores derived 
from errors. There was a smaller expectation by condition interaction effect for the comparison 
with the reverse contrasting condition, β = .28, than that in the initial model, β = .83, and the 
adjusted effect did not reach significance, t(110) = 1.80, p = .08. Furthermore, the condition by 
interaction effect for the comparison with the irrelevant content control condition was smaller, β 
= .20, than that in the initial model, β = .80, and also was not significant, t(110)  = 1.21, p = .15. 
Hence, the difference between the mental contrasting condition and the reverse contrasting 
condition as well as between the mental contrasting condition and the irrelevant content control 
condition in the relation between expectations and feelings of responsibility was at least partially 
mediated by the implicit categorization of reality as obstacle, measured via compatibility scores 
derived from errors.  
Discussion 
In the mental contrasting condition, students with high expectations of success showed 
the strongest compatibility effects upon seeing their reality aspects, and those with low 
expectations of success showed the weakest. We found these mental contrasting effects on 
implicit categorization of reality as obstacle when compatibility effects were measured via 
reaction times or errors. In contrast, students in the control conditions (i.e., reverse contrasting 
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and irrelevant content control condition) showed intermediate compatibility effects independent 
of their expectations of success. Finally, interaction effects of conditions with expectations on 
feelings of responsibility were mediated by implicit categorizations of reality as obstacle. This 
pattern of results supports our notion that mental contrasting changes the meaning of the reality, 
which in turn modulates goal pursuit.  
Our control analyses in Study 2 confirmed that mental contrasting did not shape implicit 
categorization of obstacles in general (i.e., the words obstacle, barrier). Rather, mental 
contrasting modulated the meaning of participants’ own reality as to whether it signaled to them 
an obstacle or not. However, seeing one’s own reality aspect as an obstacle should affect the 
detection of potential new obstacles. When people understand the role an object plays in relation 
to others, they are prone to discover other objects with a similar role (e.g., Gentner & Markman, 
1997; Markman & Gentner, 1993). Thus, in the final study, we tested whether mental contrasting 
with high expectations of success facilitates the identification of new obstacles.  
Study 3: Detecting New Obstacles 
To test whether mental contrasting affects the readiness to detect new obstacles that stand 
in the way of reaching the desired future, we examined the performance of children on two chess 
tasks, an obstacle task and a non-obstacle task. In chess, players sometimes have to detect a piece 
(e.g., a queen) that is, physically, an obstacle on the way to capture the opponents’ king (i.e., 
checkmate). Whereas more often than not one’s opponent’s pieces such as the queen are 
obstacles because they are protecting squares important for checkmate, sometimes one’s own 
pieces may stand in the way. Even one’s queen, the most powerful piece a player has, might 
physically obstruct capturing the opposing king. In these cases, the queen needs to be removed in 
order to win, a situation called clearance (Neistadt, 1987; Polgar, 1998) or clearing the space 
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(Blokh, 1994). In our obstacle task, children had to detect their queen as an obstacle towards 
checkmate (Figure 3, left side). In contrast, in the non-obstacle task, none of the pieces—neither 
one’s own nor the opposing ones—was an obstacle physically standing in the way or an obstacle 
because it protected important squares. Rather, the non-obstacle task required the children to 
detect a trap for capturing the king (Figure 3, right side).  
Pilot testing found that the selected chess tasks were equally difficult for children about 
10 to 12 years old, who had received formal chess education, and whose performance level did 
not exceed 1300 points on the Deutsche Wertungszahl, the German equivalent of the Elo system 
(i.e., an objective standard to measure the performance level of chess players, Elo, 1978). We 
preselected children accordingly. We hypothesized that children in the mental contrasting 
condition with high expectations should most readily detect the queen as a physical obstacle 
towards the desired checkmate and thus should perform best of all children on the obstacle task, 




Children were recruited from six chess clubs in Germany. The coaches of each of these 
chess clubs preselected the children based on the following criteria: a) about 10 to 12 years old, 
b) received formal chess education, and c) performance level did not exceed 1300 points on the 
Deutsche Wertungszahl. A total of 65 children (13 female, age M = 11.5 years, SD = 1.2) 
participated.  
Procedure and Measures 
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Children learned that the objective of the study was to discover more about what children 
who play chess think and feel. A lottery in which they could win chess computer programs was 
included. We then measured children’s chess skills. We assessed the time period they had been 
in a chess club and their performance on two baseline chess tasks mirroring the experimental 
chess tasks. These baseline tasks enabled us to use actual performance as a baseline measure and 
helped the children to form accurate expectations of solving the critical chess tasks. Also, we 
wanted to familiarize the children with the procedure of working on the experimental chess 
tasks. Specifically, experimenters first arranged the chess pieces on the board to ensure correct 
positioning of every piece, handed the children the task sheet, and then each child had a 
maximum of 8 minutes to solve the baseline task.  
Children then learned that they could participate in a lottery to win chess computer 
programs. For this lottery, they could win tickets according to their performance on two further 
chess tasks. When they solved one of these tasks in less than 2 minutes, they would get 5 tickets; 
in less than 4 minutes, they would get 4 tickets, in less than 6 minutes they would get 3 tickets, 
and in less than 8 minutes, they would get 2 tickets. Next, children were told that before starting 
the two chess tasks, we wanted to know more about their thoughts and feelings about these tasks 
and the lottery. Children first indicated how many tickets they would like to win, ranging from 1 
to 10, and then, to measure expectations, we asked the children how likely it was that they would 
win the desired number of tickets on a scale ranging from 1 (not at all) to 7 (very likely).  
Thereafter, we established two experimental conditions, a mental contrasting and a 
reverse contrasting condition. In the mental contrasting condition, children named a desired 
future they associated with winning the desired number of tickets. They read: “Imagine you 
would win the desired number of tickets – what would be the very best thing about winning? 
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Please write down this very best thing.” Then, children wrote down their corresponding thoughts 
and images. They read: 
“Now, try to imagine this very best thing. What does it mean to you? Try first to depict 
this very best thing by using your fantasies and imagination. Then, try to describe these 
fantasies and images as vividly as possible. Use the provided space.  
In the next step, they were asked to imagine a reality aspect that could hinder them 
winning the desired number of tickets. First they read: “What could hinder you from winning the 
desired number of tickets. What could stand in your way? Please write down this obstacle.” 
Children were then led to write down their corresponding thoughts and images. They read: 
“Now, try to imagine this obstacle. What does it mean to you? Try first to depict this 
obstacle by using your fantasies and imagination. Then, try to describe these fantasies 
and images as vividly as possible. Use the provided space.”  
In the reverse contrasting condition, children elaborated the same content with the same 
instructions, but in reverse order.  
Dependent Variables 
Finally, the children worked on the two experimental chess tasks, the obstacle and the 
non-obstacle task, in randomized order. On the obstacle task, to attain checkmate, children had to 
detect that their own queen stood in the way of the checkmate (Figure 3, left side). They were 
given the white pieces, and the solution to checkmate required two moves with the first being 
moving one’s own queen. Following the notation of the World Chess Federation, the solution for 
the obstacle task was: 
1. Qf6+ Bxf6 
2. Nf7# 
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In the non-obstacle task, to attain checkmate, children had to detect a series of moves 
trapping the opposing king, unrelated to seeing something standing in the way. Importantly, in 
the non-obstacle task neither one’s own nor the opposing pieces were obstacles physically 
standing in the way to checkmate, nor were obstacles protecting important squares (Figure 3, 
right side). The children had the black pieces, and the solution required three moves. In the 
notation of the World Chess Federation, the solution for the non-obstacle task was: 
1. … Rxg2+ 
2. Kxg2 Qxf3+ 
3. Kg1 Qf2# 
Note that in the obstacle task the player’s color is white and the solution for attaining 
checkmate in the obstacle task involves two moves; in the non-obstacle task the player’s color is 
black and the solution involves three moves. However, the tasks do not differ in difficulty, as we 
had pretested and as it is described in chess text books. Therefore, we assume that neither the 
color of pieces nor the number of moves to reach checkmate affect performance on these tasks. 
As our dependent variables, we recorded whether the child discovered the right solution to each 
problem (coded 1) or not (coded 0). We used the same procedure that we used for the baseline 
tasks, described above. 
Results 
In all of the subsequent analyses, we adjusted for skill level by including the performance 
on the control chess tasks as well as years of practicing chess as control variables. 
Obstacle versus Non-Obstacle Task Performance 
We first tested whether the effects of the self-regulatory strategies differed for the 
performance on the obstacle and the non-obstacle tasks. Using generalized estimating equations 
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(Schafer, 2006) to account for within-subject correlations between the performance on both 
tasks, we specified a model including as independent variables, condition, the continuous 
expectation measure, type of task (i.e., non-obstacle versus obstacle) and the control variables 
(i.e., performance on the baseline chess tasks and years of practicing chess), all two-way 
interactions as well as the three-way interaction between condition, the continuous expectation 
measure, and type of task; dependent variable was performance on the tasks. As predicted, we 
found the significant three-way interaction effect, χ2(1) = 4.22, p = .04, indicating that the 
expectancy-dependent effects of condition differed for performance on the obstacle and on the 
non-obstacle tasks. Consequently, we analyzed the performance for both tasks independently. 
Performance on Obstacle Task  
We performed a logistic regression analysis with performance on the obstacle task (i.e., 
solving the task or not) as dependent variable, and expectations, condition, and the interaction 
between expectations and condition as independent variables. As hypothesized, there was an 
interaction effect between condition and expectations in predicting the likelihood of solving the 
obstacle task, χ2(1, N = 65) = 4.94, p = .02, Nagelkerke R2change = .09. As depicted in Figure 4, in 
children with high expectations, mental contrasting led to a higher probability of solving the 
chess task than reverse contrasting, χ2(1, N = 65) = 6.32, p = .01, whereas in children with low 
expectations mental contrasting condition tended to lead to a lower probability of solving the 
task than children in the reverse contrasting condition, χ2(1, N = 65) = 2.90, p = .08.  
Performance on Non-Obstacle Task  
We then looked at children’s performance at the non-obstacle task. A logistic regression 
analysis was performed with expectations, condition, and the interaction between expectations 
and condition. We did not find a main effect of condition, χ2(1, N = 65) = .81, p = .37, a main 
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effect for expectations, χ2(1, N = 65) = .87, p = .35, or an interaction effect between condition 
and expectations on the performance on the task, χ2(1, N = 65) = .01, p = .99 (see Figure 4).  
Discussion 
We found that mental contrasting paired with high expectations led children to detect an 
obstacle standing in the way of solving a chess task more readily than in the reverse contrasting 
control condition. This finding suggests that mental contrasting paired with high expectations 
readies participants to detect new obstacles which stand in the way of achieving their desired 
future. Once participants understand the meaning of the reality aspect as an obstacle toward 
attaining the desired future, they more easily detect new aspects in their environment with a 
similar function. Mental contrasting paired with low expectations had the opposite effect: 
Children were less likely to detect the obstacle to solving the chess task than in the reverse 
contrasting control condition. This finding suggests that mental contrasting with low 
expectations inhibits the detection of relevant obstacles. As predicted, in the reverse contrasting 
condition, there was no indication of either facilitated obstacle detection when paired with high 
expectations or of inhibited obstacle detection when paired with low expectations of success. 
These results expand recent findings on how mental contrasting facilitates effective goal 
pursuit. Kappes et al. (2012), for instance, found that mentally contrasting with high expectations 
of success prepared participants for overcoming their reality aspects when actually encountering 
them. Specifically, mental contrasting with high expectations led participants to form strong 
mental associations between their reality aspect (i.e., elevator when the desired future was 
fitness) and a behavior instrumental for overcoming the reality aspect (i.e., exercise; Study 2). 
When participants stepped out of the lab and encountered their reality aspect, the strongly 
formed mental associations elicited the instrumental behavior (i.e., participants took the stairs 
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despite the elevator being right in front of them; Study 2). Expanding these results, the present 
research showed that mental contrasting with high expectations also readies participants to detect 
new obstacles standing in the way, thereby providing additional preparation for goal pursuit that 
goes beyond the mentally elaborated reality aspect.  
General Discussion 
Three studies support our notion that mental contrasting a desired future paired with high 
expectations strengthens the meaning of the present reality as an obstacle. Specifically, after 
mental contrasting paired with high expectations, participants evaluated their reality aspect more 
negatively (Study 1) and categorized their reality more as an obstacle (Study 2) than respective 
participants in the control conditions. The results also showed that the effects of mental 
contrasting on goal pursuit (exam preparation in Study 1, feelings of responsibility in Study 2) 
were mediated by the change in meaning of present reality. Moreover, children after mental 
contrasting paired with high expectations were more ready to detect a chess piece as an obstacle 
to achieving checkmate and winning a desired prize compared to the control condition (Study 3), 
further suggesting that mental contrasting paired with high expectations promotes the meaning of 
the present reality as an obstacle. On the other hand, mental contrasting paired with low 
expectations weakened the meaning of reality aspects as obstacles. Participants evaluated their 
reality aspect less negatively than respective participants in the control conditions (Study 1), and 
implicitly categorized their reality aspect less as an obstacle (Study 2). This lack of obstacle 
understanding translated into the suspension of efforts to attain the desired future (Study 1, 2).  
Finally, participants with low expectations in the mental contrasting condition were less ready 
than control participants to detect a chess piece as an obstacle (Study 3), suggesting that mental 
contrasting paired with low expectations inhibits subsequent obstacle detection. 
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Alternative Explanations 
One might argue that not only mental contrasting, but any elaboration of both the desired 
future and the reality would lead to the understanding of one’s reality as an obstacle in line with 
one’s expectations of success. The results of the reverse contrasting condition do not support this 
prediction. Elaborating the reality first without the desired future as a context did not influence 
the meaning of the reality as an obstacle, and it did not match the meaning of reality as an 
obstacle to people’s expectations of success (Study 1, 2, and 3). However, one might argue that 
any elaboration ending with the reality (as in mental contrasting) affects the meaning of reality as 
an obstacle. The results of the dwelling condition do not support this argument (Study 1). 
Elaborating the reality without beforehand elaborating the desired future did not affect the 
meaning of reality. Finally, one might argue that conditions such as the reverse contrasting and 
dwelling conditions obscured the meaning of reality, not mental contrasting changing it. The 
results of the irrelevant content control condition in which participants elaborated content 
unrelated to the desired future or the present reality, suggest otherwise. Here, participants 
showed the same pattern of results as the participants in the reverse contrasting condition (Study 
2).  
Another concern might relate to the use of idiosyncratic words. In Studies 1 and 2, 
participants evaluated and implicitly categorized obstacle words that they had previously named. 
Hence, maybe systematic differences in the idiosyncratic reality words between the conditions 
could explain effects. Yet, since participants were randomly assigned to the different conditions 
after they named their idiosyncratic obstacle words, potential differences in these words such as 
word length and word frequency cannot explain the results.   
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Finally, we measured rather than manipulated expectations. However, past research 
showed that mental contrasting has the same effects on goal pursuit independent on whether the 
expectation where measured or manipulated. Oettingen, Marquardt, and Gollwitzer (2011), for 
instance, first manipulated participants’ expectations about their creative potential, then induced 
a mental contrasting condition (versus control conditions), and finally observed creative 
performance. In two experiments, they found that participants in the mental contrasting condition 
with experimentally manipulated high expectations outperformed participants with 
experimentally manipulated high expectations in the control conditions. They also outperformed 
all other participants who were induced moderate expectations. These results suggest that mental 
contrasting effects are not due to confounding variables associated with measured expectations, 
but rather that mental contrasting renders expectations relevant for goal pursuit. Furthermore, in 
our studies, the relationships between expectations and the dependent variables in the mental 
contrasting condition are unlikely to reflect preexisting associations between the variables since 
they only emerged in the mental contrasting condition, but not in the control conditions.  
Theoretical Implications  
According to fantasy realization theory (Oettingen, 2000; Oettingen et al., 2001; 
summary by Oettingen, 2012), mental contrasting helps people to understand that the reality is an 
obstacle standing in the way of the desired future, and thereby exerts its influence on goal 
pursuit. The present findings underscore this notion and thereby help to interpret previous 
findings of mental contrasting effects. Perceiving the reality as an obstacle standing in the way of 
the desired future should mobilize goal-directed effort (Oettingen et al., 2009), spur forming 
plans to overcome the obstacle (Oettingen et al., 2001, Study 1), increase feelings of 
responsibility for the attainment of the desired future (Study 2; Oettingen et al., 2001, Study 3), 
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and further insights into what it takes to attain to overcome the obstacle and to attain the desired 
future (Adriaanse et al., 2010; Kirk et al., 2011). On the other hand, the present results also shed 
light on why previous research repeatedly found that mental contrasting, when expectations are 
low, led to decreased efforts towards attaining the desired future. Once the reality is understood 
as being unlikely to be overcome, it is not an obstacle anymore, and hence people no longer 
muster effort or make plans to attain the desired future.  
By helping people to understand the reality as an obstacle, mental contrasting paired with 
high expectations should also help people to recognize behaviors instrumental in overcoming the 
obstacle. In line with this argument, recent studies found that mental contrasting paired with high 
expectations established strong associations between the reality and instrumental behaviors 
which in turn instigated the behavior when the reality aspects were actually encountered (Kappes 
et al., 2012). Furthermore, such mental contrasting effects should be rendered even more 
powerful, if participants are given effective strategies to handle their reality aspects. And indeed, 
giving participants implementation intentions (Gollwitzer, 1999), an effective self-regulatory 
strategy to address obstacles, amplified the effects of mental contrasting on successfully 
changing one’s behavior (Adriaanse et al., 2010; Kirk et al., in press). Additionally, mental 
contrasting rendered implementation intentions more effective than implementation intentions 
alone (Adriaanse et al., 2010; Kirk et al., in press). These results underscore that the combination 
of understanding the reality as an obstacle and effective strategies to overcome the obstacles 
should ensure self-regulation success. 
The Meaning of Reality and Goal Pursuit 
The results of Studies 1 and 2 stress the importance of the meaning of the reality as an 
obstacle for goal pursuit. In both studies, we found that understanding the reality as obstacle 
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facilitated the beneficial effects of mental contrasting on goal pursuit. These findings are in line 
with the assumption that self-regulatory efforts critically hinge on the identification of the 
relevant obstacles that then can be addressed (Gollwitzer, Bayer, & McCulloch, 2005; Oettingen, 
1996; Zhang & Fishbach, 2010). This notion also implies that a lack of the meaning of the reality 
as an obstacle should lead to the cessation of efforts. The findings in the mental contrasting 
condition paired with low expectations support this implication. Here, participants’ lack of 
seeing the reality as an obstacle led to reduced effort to attain the desired future even when 
compared to the control groups.  
In Study 1, participants in the control conditions did not invest the amount of effort that 
would have been adequate based on participants’ expectations of success. We assume that the 
inadequate investment was not due to lack of capability, as students’ counterparts in the mental 
contrasting conditions did invest the requested effort. Similar, in Study 2, students in the control 
conditions did not feel that it is their responsibility to get into their desired graduate school, even 
when their expectations of success were high. It seems that the understanding of the relevant 
reality aspects as obstacle was missing to trigger efforts and feelings of responsibility. Taken 
together, our results speak to the importance of assigning the meaning of obstacles to relevant 
aspects of reality for successful goal pursuit.   
Conclusion 
The country singer Dolly Parton once said in an interview: “The way I see it, if you want 
the rainbow, you gotta put up with the rain." In a similar vein, research on mental contrasting 
suggests that in order to attain a desired future, people should not exclude the reality from their 
thinking. Rather, after dreaming about the desired future, people should turn to mentally 
elaborating the reality. Only then will they discover whether the reality constitutes an obstacle 
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that can be overcome towards reaching the desired future. Once the reality acquires the meaning 
of an obstacle, solutions might reveal themselves, such as simply bringing an umbrella along the 
way.   
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Figure 1. Study 1: Regression lines depict the relations between expectations of success and 
evaluations of the reality as negative (left) and between expectations of success and exam 
preparation (right) as a function of condition.  
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Figure 2. Study 2: Regression lines depict the relations between expectations of success and 
compatibility effects derived from reaction times (left), compatibility effects derived from errors 
(middle), and feelings of responsibility (right) as a function of condition.  
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Figure 3. On the obstacle task (left), children had to identify that their own queen (circled) stands 
in the way of the checkmate, on the non-obstacle task (right), the solution required a series of 
clever moves trapping the king, unrelated to seeing something standing in the way. 
 
   White to move       Black to move
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Figure 4. Study 3: Logistic regression lines depict the relation between expectations of success 
and probability of solving the obstacle task (left) and between expectations of success and 
probability of solving the non-obstacles task (right) as a function of condition.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
